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Abstract
This paper presents a nonparametric analysis of the impact of the 2008 crisis on earnings distribution in
Turkey. Using micro-level data from the Household Labor Force Survey (2004 – 2011), I show that the
crisis has operated most visibly above the upper quartile of the earnings distribution. I present three
main findings: (1) the share of the top decile—especially the top percentile—has increased significantly
right after the crisis, (2) the top quartile (i.e., the right tail) of labor incomes in Turkey resembles, on
average, a Pareto distribution with a corresponding Gini coefficient of around 0.23, and (3) following the
crisis, the earnings differentials have widened above the top quartile and wildly deviated from the Pareto
form. I document that the changes observed right after the crisis have mostly been temporary; that is, a
normalization process has operated in the aftermath of the crisis. I argue that the health of the domestic
banking system might be an important determinant of the effect of large scale financial crises on top labor
incomes. A sound banking system can generate income polarization in a country, when global crises lead
to asymmetric income reallocations across sectors.
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1 Introduction
Top incomes capture only a small fraction of the population, but they represent a quite sig-
nificant share of total income and total taxes paid in an economy [Atkinson, Piketty, and
Saez (2011)]. Hence, the extent of inequality is very sensitive to movements in top income
shares. The same is true when the focus is only the labor income. The labor markets have re-
cently been generating considerable inequality in developed countries, especially in the United
States, with the very top earners capturing a large fraction of total income. Estimates based
on US earnings data reveal that labor income earned at the top percentile has surged from
5.1 percent in 1970s to 12.4 percent in 2007 [Saez (2008)]. Similar changes have also been
recorded in most European countries and Japan, in slightly smaller magnitudes [Piketty, Saez,
and Stantcheva (2013)].
In the literature, there is an unsettled issue that I want to highlight: the effect of economic
crises on top labor incomes. Although the underlying mechanisms are still unclear, the main
consensus is that the degree of earnings inequality generally goes down right after the shock
[Atkinson and Morelli (2011)].1 To check whether this consensus can turn into a general rule
and to understand the underlying mechanisms that can connect crises to inequality, a larger
volume of empirical evidence from studies based on individual country experiences are needed.
In this study, I investigate the effect of the 2008 crisis on top labor incomes and, more gener-
ally, on earnings differentials in Turkey. The Turkish case is interesting, because Turkey has
demonstrated one of the most resilient macroeconomic performances as a response to the crisis.
Past unpleasant experiences—mainly the crises of 1990s—had revealed severe deficiencies in
the Turkish banking system. The burden was so large that all of the financial regulations and
policies designed in the last 10 years targeted a strong, stable, and credible banking system so
as not to face similar catastrophic experiences again. Having this strong banking system in the
background, the negative effects of the 2008 crisis have only been transitory, sector-specific,
and moderate.
1For alternative explanations on the potential mechanisms, see, for example, Kumhof and Ranciere (2010), Fitoussi and
Saraceno (2010), Rajan (2010), and Philippon and Reshef (2012).
2
I group the empirical results under three main categories. First, I find that the share of the
top decile, especially the top percentile, has increased significantly right after the crisis. In
particular, I show that the share of the top percentile is stabilized around 5 percent for the
period 2004–2008, but it jumped to 8 percent in 2009. A normalization process has operated
thereafter, pushing the share of the top percentile back to around 5 percent. This is in
contrast with what the empirical literature on the link between crises and inequality reports.
For example, Roine, Vlachos, and Waldenstrom (2009) find using cross-country data covering
the period 1900–2000 that a financial crisis—domestic or international—would permanently
reduce the share of the top 1 percent by about 0.2 percentage points for each year of the crisis.
Using data from the US, Morelli (2011) shows that the top percentile has been negatively
affected for three years following the financial crisis, before starting to recover.
Although this result sharply deviates from what the literature documents, it nevertheless
communicates important insights regarding the mechanisms that may be potentially affecting
the changes in the income share of the top percentile during financial crises. First of all,
based on real macroeconomic indicators, the effect of the 2008 crisis on the Turkish economy
looked severe. The GDP growth was -5 percent in 2009 and the rate of unemployment in the
non-agriculture sector jumped from 12 percent to 19 percent. But the banking sector was still
healthy and the repercussions were never felt like the waves of a banking shock. Profits in the
banking sector were quite high, which kept the salaries high and generated large bonuses for
top employees.2 Based on this observation, I argue that the health of the domestic banking
system might be an important determinant of the effect of global financial crises on top one
percent earners [see Bell and van Reenen (2010) for a similar insight]. This is an interesting
case, because it suggests that a sound banking system can generate income polarization in the
society, when global crises lead to asymmetric income reallocations across sectors.
The main mechanism at work might have been operating through the structure and the com-
position of the financial assets. For example, in the U.S., the “bad” assets have been the
major problem; they pulled the returns and profits down in the entire economy. The negative
2This is in sharp contrast with the case in the US and most of the other developed countries. Lee and Rose (2010) document
that bank profitability was damped and the whole banking system was under significant liquidity pressure in 2009.
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consequences of the crisis have been persistent and severe. The Turkish banking system, on
the other hand, did not have a significant amount of bad assets. The crisis hit the economy
through temporary capital outflows—i.e., outflow of the so-called hot money. The resulting
temporary increase in the returns of interest bearing assets opened up huge profit opportunities
for asset holders. This in turn inflated earnings, including performance pay and bonuses.
The 1997–98 Asian crisis provides an example similar to the Turkish experience. In Singapore,
top income shares increased significantly following the crisis [Atkinson, Piketty, and Saez
(2011)], which was basically a regional shock impinging on individual countries. The rise in
top income shares in Singapore after the crisis was remarkable but only temporary. Just as in
the Turkish case, Singapore had a strong banking system relative to a majority of the countries
in the region and their government performed an active crisis management strategy.
Second, the top quartile (i.e., the right tail) of the earnings distribution in Turkey resembles,
on average, a Pareto distribution with a corresponding Gini coefficient of roughly 0.23. This
is an important finding for two reasons. (1) The Pareto distribution has the property that the
distance between observations is constant for all points over the distribution. If these distances
define the extent of “deprivation” in the society, than the dispersion parameter of the Pareto
distribution is a good measure of social distress due to inequality.3 (2) A Gini coefficient of
0.23 (against an overall Gini coefficient of 0.40) implies that deprivation below the top quartile
is much higher than that above the top quartile. In other words, income differentials above
the top quartile have been much smaller than those below the top quartile.
Third, 2009 has been the only year within the 2004–2011 period in which the earnings dis-
tribution above the top quartile has widely deviated from the Pareto form. In this year, the
earnings differentials followed a U -shaped pattern meaning that the differentials have been
much higher at the top and the bottom than they are at the middle of the distribution. This
suggests that deprivation in the society has gone up significantly in 2009, given the definition
above. This is interesting because, as I discuss above, improved stability of the banking system
has led the Turkish economy to develop a resilient macroeconomic performance following the
3See Cowell (2011) for extensive information on the properties of the distributional forms often used in the study of inequality.
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global financial crisis, but it has also led to increased levels of distress in the society. This is
also related to the pay comparisons literature. For example, Clark and Oswald (1996) find
that a deterioration in the relative income perceptions in the society can lead to decreased job
satisfaction and satisfaction from life in the overall. I conclude that a strong banking system
can itself generate income polarization and deprivation in a country, when global crises lead
to asymmetric income reallocations across sectors.
In terms of the statistical techniques used, this paper is closest to Saez (2001). Saez develops a
method to measure income differentials over the earnings distribution to study optimal income
taxation. I use his method to analyze the impact of the 2008 crisis on earnings differentials in
Turkey. This method can be classified as a nonparametric method, because it enables the use
of the raw data for the purpose of mapping the empirical earnings distribution into a certain
set of formulas, using which one can estimate the effects of the crisis on several distributional
outcomes. By using a non-parametric technique, I avoid imposing a priori functional form
assumptions on the structure of earnings differentials.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the details of the statistical model.
Section 3 summarizes the data, presents the results, and elaborates the findings. Section 4
concludes.
2 The Statistical Model
The statistical model builds on the method developed by Saez (2001). The main object that
I focus attention throughout the paper is a truncated mathematical expectations operator.
Let X ∈ X be a random variable with support set X and let x denote its realizations. I also
let FX(x) and fX(x) denote the cumulative distribution function (cdf) and the probability
distribution function (pdf) of this random variable, respectively. For algebraic simplicity, I
assume that these functions are absolutely continuous in the support set X . Then,
E[X|X > x] =
∫ ∞
x
z∫∞
x
dFX(z)
dFX(z) (2.1)
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is the (upper) truncated mean of the random variable X, where x is the truncation reference
point.
Let d(x) be a twice continuously differentiable—ensured by the continuity of FX—function of
x as follows:
d(x) =
E[X|X > x]
x
. (2.2)
The intuition is the following. d(x) measures the distance between the observations on the
right tail. A higher d(x) corresponds to a case in which these distances are larger. To put
this statistical definition into specific context, suppose now that x refers to real earnings
observations in a nationally representative micro-level dataset. If the depression stemming
from being poor is proportional to the income gap, then d(x) can be interpreted as a measure
of deprivation in the society. In other words, it is a comparison of the specific real earnings
observation x to the mean real earnings above x. The functional form of d(x) depends on the
shape and curvature of the cdf FX .
A particular functional form that is used in the literature to study top incomes is the Pareto
distribution. Let (σ − 1)X−σ be the pdf of a Pareto random variable X over the support
[1,∞). I assume σ > 2 to ensure a finite variance. Lower σ means that the dispersion (and,
therefore, inequality) is higher. The following proposition holds under the Pareto distribution
assumption.
Proposition 1. If X is a Pareto random variable with a dispersion parameter σ > 2, then
d(x) is a constant. Specifically,
d(x) =
σ − 1
σ − 2 . (2.3)
Proof: The proof simply follows applying the integration by parts formula on the integral
1
x
∫ ∞
x
zdFX(z).
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In words, when FX is of the Pareto form, then d(x) is a constant described perfectly by the
dispersion parameter σ.4 In an application related to optimal high-income taxation in the US
economy, Saez (2001) shows that the upper tail of the US earnings distribution resembles a
Pareto distribution because d(x) is a constant.
In this framework, taking the truncated mean E[X|X > x] to data without invoking a specific
functional form in order to identify the properties of d(x) corresponds to a nonparametric
identification strategy. Remember that d(x) is a direct measure of income differentials at
the top of the earnings distribution. Parallel to this definition, I employ such a strategy to
study the impact of the 2008 crisis on the differentials at the top of the earnings distribution.
Specifically, I use the raw data to calculate d(x) for each potential realization x of the random
variable X. The next section describes the data I use and presents the main findings in detail.
3 Data and Findings
I use micro-level data from the Turkish Household Labor Force Survey (THLFS) conducted
by the Turkish Statistical Institute (TURKSTAT) for the period 2004–2011. It is a large,
survey-based, and nationally-representative dataset based on which the official unemployment
and earnings statistics have been calculated and published. The sample I choose consists of
employed individuals of age 16 and above. The earnings series are deflated taking 2004 as the
base year; that is, I work with real earnings. The survey asks the after-tax monthly earnings
(i.e., wage income plus other income including performance pay and bonuses). I annualize the
monthly data in the analysis. Appropriate frequency weights are used in all calculations.
Figure (1) plots the main findings. This is basically a plot of d(x) (i.e., the coefficient) versus
x, where x denotes the real earnings (plotted in the log scale). The plot is based on a year-
by-year estimation of the coefficient, d(x). The figure says that the distances are large for
4Consider a Weibull example. Then αλXλ−1e−αX
λ
is the pdf of the Weibull random variable over the support [0,∞). λ > 0
is the shape parameter and α > 0 is the scale parameter. Then
d(x) = α−1/λ
eαx
λ
x
[
Γ
(
1 +
1
λ
)
+ γ
(
1 +
1
λ
, αxλ
)]
, (2.4)
where Γ(·) is a Gamma function and γ(·) is an incomplete Gamma integral. In this more general form, d(x) is a function of x,
rather than a constant.
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the low earners, while they become smaller as real earnings increase. After some point, which
roughly corresponds to the cutoff for the top quartile, the differentials are stabilized for all
years in the data horizon, except 2009. In 2009, however, earnings differentials above the top
quartile of the distribution have widened nonnegligibly contributing to increased polarization,
inequality, and deprivation in the society.
Leaving out the year 2009, I observe a pretty stable and consistent pattern: in the upper
quartile of the earnings distribution, d(x) roughly corresponds to a constant, which is ap-
proximately 1.57. From the Proposition 1, when d(x) is a constant, the earnings distribution
resembles the Pareto form. Formally, d(x) = (σ − 1)/(σ − 2), where σ > 2 is the dispersion
parameter of the earnings distribution. d(x) = 1.57 means that σ ≈ 3.75. From Aaberge
(2007), the Pareto distribution has a direct relationship with the Gini coefficient, G, via the
following formula:
G = 1
2(σ − 1)− 1 . (3.1)
Plugging σ = 3.75 into this formula yields G ≈ 0.23. Considering that the estimated Gini
coefficient for the entire earnings distribution is around 0.40 (see TURKSTAT), I conclude
that the degree of inequality is much lower within the top quartile in Turkey, excluding 2009.
Moreover, the level of deprivation in the upper quartile is a constant.
In 2009, however, I observe a wild deviation from the Pareto form, i.e., d(x) is no more con-
stant. In fact, an eyeball test reveals that d′(x) > 0 in the top quartile. This means that
distances among high earners (i.e., earnings above the top quartile) have increased systemat-
ically following the crisis. Although, the distances have gone back to pre-crisis levels within a
year or so, the reaction of top incomes in 2009 has been quite remarkable. If earnings differ-
entials describe the extent of deprivation (or social distress) in the society, then the estimates
suggest that deprivation and polarization has gone up in 2009.
Another interesting observation is related to the movements in the share of the top percentile.
Figure (2) plots the time-series behavior of the income share of the top one percent earners.
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The earnings share of the top percentile sharply increased to 8 percent in 2009, while it
remained close to 5 percent before and after 2009. Same is true when one looks at the mean
earnings in the top percentile rather than shares [see Figure (3)]. Clearly, there is a jump
in 2009. The mean annual earnings in the top quartile have become around 66,000 Turkish
Liras (in 2004 terms), whereas this amount stays around 40,000 Turkish Liras before and after
2009. The reported gap in mean earnings in the top percentile is more than 50% when the
pre- and post-crisis periods are compared. This suggests that widening earnings differentials
in the top quartile comes mainly from the developments in the top percentile. However, as
Table (1) suggests, there is a widening in earnings differentials in the top decile. This means
that top earnings have moved up altogether, but the movement is larger in the top percentile.
I also check whether or not any compositional shifts in the observable worker characteristics
can explain the jump in the top percentile in 2009. Table (2) summarizes the demographic
composition of the top percentile individuals in the sample from 2004 to 2011. I see no
obvious demographic compositional change pattern that may directly lead to a jump in the
top percentile earnings shares in 2009. Nevertheless, I see slightly more females than males,
younger than older, married than nonmarried, urban than rural, tenured than nontenured,
and educated than uneducated workers within the top percentile in 2009.
The literature investigating the determinants of the movements in top income shares focuses on
individual country experiences to be able to put together a coherent story that would enhance
our understanding of the main mechanisms at work. In this study, I concentrate on the effect
of the 2008 crisis on top labor income shares and on earnings differentials in Turkey. The
consensus in the existing literature—based on country experiences—is that crises, especially
banking crises, tend to reduce top income shares. Roine, Vlachos, and Waldenstrom (2009)
show that the share of top incomes is positively correlated with GDP growth. Specifically,
they find using cross-country data that a financial crisis permanently reduces the share of top
percentile by about 0.2 percentage points for each year of the crisis.
However, as my findings suggest, the share of the top labor incomes has increased right after
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the crisis in Turkey. The increase is observed above the top decile, but the most notable
movement is in the top percentile. This is in stark contrast with the well-documented positive
relationship between the GDP growth rates and top income shares. What is the explanation?
I propose the health of the local banks as an important determinant of the link between crises
and top income shares. The Turkish banks were quite “healthy” when the crisis hit. Interest
rates went up following the initial shocks. This lead to tightening in the credit markets, which
led to deterioration in the financial conditions of the small firms in the real economy; but,
at the same time, banks made enormous profits through their holdings of interest bearing
assets (mostly treasury bills). The temporary increase in the returns of interest bearing assets
opened up huge profit opportunities for asset holders, which were large firms and banks. This
in turn inflated earnings, including performance pay and bonuses. As a result, in the Turkish
example, small firms and entrepreneurs suffered, but large firms, banks, and high earners
benefited the crisis.
I conclude that in assessing the effects of crises on inequality, a well-founded link between the
financial sector and the individual-level earnings has to be established. The Turkish case study
and its comparison with the US/European experiences suggest that how the crises affect the
financial sector is the key to understanding how a negative shock can diffuse into the income
distribution in an economy. Theoretical macro models studying the effect of crises on income
inequality should, therefore, focus on the financial sector and its role in transmitting the shock
waves to the rest of the economy.
4 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, I use a nonparametric technique to estimate the effect of the 2008 crisis on earn-
ings differentials in the Turkish economy. The Turkish case is particularly interesting, because
the strong banking system in Turkey has led the economy to react much more efficiently to
the crisis than most of the developed countries did. The focus is on labor income. I show
that earnings differentials above the top quartile have widened within the year following the
crisis. Moreover, the share of the top percentile has jumped to 8 percent, which was around
10
5 percent before the crisis. I also find that a normalization process has operated and the
pre-crisis standards have been reached from 2010 on.
These results are contrary to the emerging consensus that income differentials shrink following
the financial crises. The main observation is that the existence of a strong domestic banking
system can lead to increased income polarization in the economy, when global crises lead
to asymmetric income reallocations across sectors. Increased profitability of the banking
system, which brings together higher performance pay and bonuses to top employees may
have contributed to this outcome. Finally, I argue that the feeling of deprivation in the
society may have gone up significantly in 2009, if one defines earnings differentials as a direct
measure of deprivation.
These results inform the theoretical studies of the connection between crises and income
inequality. Specifically, this study suggests that a theoretician who is trying to understand
how crises affect the structure of inequality in the society should focus on the role and state
of the financial sector—i.e., the banks and other intermediaries.
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Figure 1: Estimates. The vertical axis plots d(x) versus x in the horizontal axis for each year. Note that x
denotes log real earnings. The deviant plot with a red color is for year 2009.
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Figure 2: Earnings share of the top percentile. The vertical axis denotes the share of top percentile
earnings in total earnings. Appropriate frequency weights are used.
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Figure 3: Average earnings in the top percentile. The vertical axis denotes the mean real earnings
(in thousand Turkish Liras) in the top percentile for the corresponding years. Appropriate frequency weights
are used.
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2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
x ≥ 99 0.053 0.057 0.059 0.045 0.06 0.08 0.063 0.055
x ≥ 95 0.149 0.16 0.165 0.159 0.164 0.177 0.164 0.169
x ≥ 90 0.262 0.254 0.268 0.258 0.269 0.275 0.261 0.244
x ≥ 75 0.463 0.476 0.446 0.49 0.488 0.485 0.483 0.491
Table 1: Top labor income shares. The cells of the table describe the top labor income shares for the
upper 1%, 5%, 10%, and 25% of the working population, respectively, from 2004 to 2011. For example, the
entry 0.463 in 2004 for x ≥ 75 should be read as follows: in 2004, the upper 25% of the working population
earn 46.3% of the total labor incomes in Turkey. The numbers in red color highlight the earnings polarization
experienced after the 2008 crisis. Appropriate frequency weights are used.
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2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Male 0.803 0.795 0.773 0.816 0.784 0.758 0.748 0.777
Age 15–19 0 0.002 0 0 0.001 0 0 0.001
Age 20–24 0.016 0.011 0.004 0.001 0.002 0.005 0.004 0.006
Age 25–29 0.084 0.103 0.079 0.061 0.083 0.074 0.068 0.043
Age 30–34 0.188 0.199 0.199 0.144 0.194 0.206 0.217 0.152
Age 35–39 0.236 0.244 0.231 0.261 0.233 0.190 0.209 0.212
Age 40–44 0.179 0.181 0.140 0.164 0.172 0.217 0.181 0.272
Age 45–49 0.146 0.121 0.170 0.151 0.132 0.119 0.123 0.150
Age 50–54 0.085 0.062 0.070 0.114 0.095 0.102 0.075 0.091
Age 55–59 0.049 0.052 0.064 0.057 0.056 0.053 0.034 0.038
Age 60–64 0.017 0.020 0.030 0.038 0.020 0.029 0.016 0.025
Age 65+ 0.002 0.006 0.013 0.011 0.013 0.007 0.004 0.011
Urban 0.972 0.960 0.966 0.967 0.943 0.961 0.922 0.954
Married 0.828 0.846 0.845 0.857 0.835 0.856 0.805 0.822
Tenure (lj) 6.970 10.075 9.737 9.511 9.651 10.056 11.491 10.331
Large Firm 0.712 0.754 0.745 0.600 0.568 0.713 0.671 0.671
No Degree 0.002 0 0 0 0 0.009 0.001 0
Primary Educ. 0.033 0.029 0.009 0.006 0.011 0 0.029 0.007
Secondary Educ. 0.018 0.010 0.011 0.004 0.011 0.006 0.027 0.011
HS Grad. 0.094 0.077 0.075 0.067 0.050 0.038 0.068 0.024
Voc. Educ. 0.077 0.049 0.047 0.032 0.027 0.022 0.070 0.027
College&+ 0.776 0.834 0.858 0.890 0.901 0.924 0.804 0.930
Informal Sector 0.039 0.041 0.061 0.074 0.054 0.033 0.018 0.028
Table 2: Demographic composition within the top percentile. The total number of observations is
194,472. Tenure (lj) refers to “tenure in the last job.” Large firm refers to workers employed in firms with 200
employees or more. Appropriate frequency weights are used.
18
